What function, according to Spinoza, is served by revealed religion? Is his view compelling?
- Rose
- Jan 31
- 9 min read
Updated: Feb 1

In this essay, we will review the functions served by religion according to Spinoza and discuss whether his view is compelling. From the historical account of the emancipated Israelite slaves in Egypt led by Moses to the contemporary religions of Spinoza’s time. We will consider how religion can be used to instill obedience to promote social cooperation, which ensures civil harmony and order. We will question the effectiveness of this specific claim in accord with Spinoza’s views on the adequacy of knowledge and reasoning and what this implies for an individual’s conatus, their ability to acquire a sense of truth, to strive for freedom, and to exist authentically.
At the time the religious state was formed, the Israelites were once again in the state of nature and, consequently, in need of governance. They were slaves in need of a political leader, a man who possessed a great imagination and who could enforce his own rules and regulations under the ruse of divine inspiration to create a cooperative and obedient people. When reviewing the history of the Israelite nation in light of Spinoza’s proposed function of religion as a tool for political harmony, we can see that it proved an effective means by which to maintain political order; despite the relapses of faith and prolonged banishment in the wilderness, the prophetic commandments did prove effective at binding the nation together. These beliefs are still inherited by the direct descendants of the Jewish faith, including the Christian Gentiles, led by the mosaic law. When read as part of a historical narrative, the Israelites were not God's chosen people but rather a multitude of uneducated people (the vulgus), in need of a political system.
This required them to adhere to a set of beliefs that Moses’ prophetic visions provided them, giving them a shared sense of meaning in their life, which simultaneously promoted a shared identity, facilitating social order as they were led from physical slavery to mental slavery. The laws were effective as they were taught to be ordained by an almighty being who could protect them in their turmoil, ease their fear, and bolster their faith. Spinoza acknowledges the necessity of the use of a prophet as an instrument of interpreting the divine law for the Israelites while systematically addressing and exposing the inadequacy of the foundations of the faith according to his spectrum of adequate reasoning. This invites us to question the validity of the laws preached as being truly divine, for ‘if something is uncertain it is most likely to be untrue’. By making obedience obligatory and the authority divine and absolute, there is no room for questioning. Yet this is what Spinoza does.
While acknowledging religion as a necessary means by which to guide mankind and create social order, he exposes the inadequacy of the beliefs the faith is founded on. Unravelling the lies to be further analysed. In Spinoza’s own words, ‘for when we admit one falsity, countless others follow.’ Revealed religion acquires its knowledge through the prophetic visions of men. These images create the narrative of the heavenly kingdom of God, with God being both a benefactor and punisher by divine right. As ruler and lawgiver, he demands exact obedience. The value of the scriptures, therefore, lies in their being applied in a practical manner. To be read as a manual or rulebook, not to stimulate the intellect or develop the mind, but to dictate the moral principles by which ordinary people should live their lives. The prophets did provide moral guidance to their communities and were effective at creating a shared social value and commonality through faith. But if revealed religion is founded on lies, then what of truth?
Spinoza makes a distinction between religion and superstition while showing that religion is also founded on superstition by contrasting the prophetic revelations born from imagination as opposed to philosophically adequate ideas concerning truths from clear reasoning. Religious indoctrination trains people to modify their conatus in accordance with the requirements of God by restraining and regulating their passions. While this makes law-abiding citizens, it also destroys their ability to reason adequately and severely limits their freedom. Theologians distorted truth and distilled mistruths to the masses. Inculcating lies into the hearts and minds of those confined by blind faith. Those who, despite their appearing to function well and orderly, were stunted in their intellectual growth. Spinoza wasn’t advocating for an artificial mirage of civil order, for he writes, ‘the minds highest good is the knowledge of God, and the minds highest virtue is to know God.” To have cognition of God is to know the truth of God, which is far from being intellectually deficient or spiritually superficial.
If ‘only God is perfectly free […] all freedom is always a matter of degree’ and none of us are truly free, compelled to confinement of some sort, then perhaps Spinoza saw religion as a means by which the masses could be guided, in order to control their unruly and unrefined state of being. But if ‘freedom means self-determining,’ then it is completely opposed to the stipulations of religious obedience. Spinoza’s concept of freedom is directly linked to an individual’s degree of causal power, developed through the cultivation of the powers of reasoning in order for a person to be capable of acting freely rather than being led. In the Ethics, he writes, ‘the highest conatus of the mind and its highest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge,’ whereas religious indoctrination hinders rather than assists a person’s developing their own intuition. Therefore, the functioning of religion in this aspect is an impediment.
These supposed contradictions in his texts cleverly open an ambiguous space needed to weaken the certainty of the power held by the theologians at his time. It is only by exposing this uncertainty and confusion, so glossed over by the doctrines of faith, that people will be forced to question their rigid beliefs. The claim is that religion is necessary for the multitude, uncultivated and poor in their powers of reasoning, who, if led in their natural state without any limitations set or external guidance, would be in turmoil and chaos; yet he writes of the concept of omnibus esse notam, that ‘the natural light […] is common to all,’ showing that he did believe all are capable of obtaining spiritual freedom and gaining redemption from the clutches of the church. Albeit perhaps at a much later time in history than his own. So, is religious influence really necessary?
Spinoza sees the benefit in people behaving well as it contributes to the harmonious functioning of society, regardless of whether the reason is because they hold fast to unfounded beliefs. In theory, it is better to adhere to mistruths and behave well than to live in an unruly state of nature and behave inharmoniously. For the common man unable to attain philosophical soundness of mind, religion is needed to confine his chaotic passions and to scaffold the society in which he lives. Spinoza shows how religion can be used as a pedagogical tool to modify a person’s conatus by binding people together by a set of regimes, rules, and regulations. This function works effectively when the goal is to create a politically passive group of people, malleable and easily led, all striving for a shared social value. However, the power held by the church and the effects of the psychological mechanisms used by religious leaders were very dangerous, resulting in religious tyranny. Instilling terror and exacting complete obedience. Spinoza himself experienced the shunning and ostracising that accompanies the rejection of religious unity implied for an unbeliever. Because of the religious conflict of his time and due to his own personal experiences, he proposed that theological institutions be reformed and managed by the state.
If none are truly free or able to act freely without reason, then it is best to submit to some form of governance. While religious governance served a purpose, Spinoza advocated for an alternative, a submission to the state. From theocracy to polity, from self-righteous piety and blind obedience to reason, wisdom, and truths. The state facilitates freedom through its rulership. By presiding over the masses, promoting peace as opposed to fear. Through leadership guided by philosophical reasoning, the state can liberate those enslaved by religion, having a positive influence on their external behavioural patterns, their moral development, and their minds to develop their ‘intellectual love of God.’
The formation of the Israelite state and the 10 commandments given by Moses form the foundation from which established contemporary religions still thrive. This highlights the importance of Spinoza’s work even for our own time and shows how religion can be used as an effective way to bind people together. This is both compelling and alarming to see that people are still bound to a set of mistruths that shape their entire existence, that dictate how they perceive the world and judge themselves as well as others. While this sense of religious unity can teach members of the faith to display the traits of social harmony, more often than not it is a cause for contention and division based on self-righteous judgements and fear of condemnation. In terms of truths and adequacy of knowledge, Spinoza sees the Bible as a ‘historically specific document relevant only to its time and place,’ its contents scribed by men inspired by inadequate forms of knowledge.
Thus, revealed religion is open to scrutiny and is considered to have improper foundations for its beliefs. It is best for those who wish to separate themselves from ignorance to question the validity of theology with philosophical reasoning. Yet, Spinoza’s tenets of universal faith seem to directly quote from scripture, i.e., ‘to love God above all else, and to love your neighbour as yourself’ and ‘faith is not saving itself, but only in relation to obedience. These tents share moral guidance to aid with being freed from fear and emotional distress, to alleviate angst for a more tranquil state of being. This seems to show that he sees value in Jesus’s moral teachings. Yet for Spinoza, ‘salvation lies neither in Christ nor in the law of Moses, but in laws of reason.’. These laws of reason he believed could be enforced by the state. Spinoza, therefore, advocated a handing over from theocratic power to the complete submission of the state, which could foster religious principles in a more intellectually adequate way.
Spinoza’s God is not the anthropomorphic God as taught by revealed religions but is a part of nature that resides within us all. If within us all is the essence of God, then we are all able to acquire the higher reason and knowledge of God. Thus, the need for religious mistruths to guide us through indoctrination becomes redundant as religion only serves to obscure truths with superstitions. When governed by the state and not the church, civil order can thrive, and true social harmony can be achieved. If all mankind has the possibility to acquire soundness of mind, by what powers should they be led? Spinoza offers alternative governance. That of the state. An overthrow of the theocracy to polity, from inadequate imaginings to adequate philosophically sound reasoning. To maintain social order while removing the tight grip of the church’s powers of indoctrination.
This essay was a university assignment. Module— The Philosophy of Spinoza. Autumn, 2021.
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