Were there any women in the history of Philosophy? If so, why have they vanished?
- Rose
- Jan 28
- 8 min read
Updated: Feb 1
The intersection of gender and philosophy reveals how historical dynamics have shaped our understanding of philosophical contributions, with a gender-biased intellectual hierarchy in favour of men. This essay will analyse how irrational biases impact our attitudes towards female philosophers, briefly looking into the historical context that has shaped the philosophical canon to uncover how this framework perpetuates the belief that there are no significant female philosophers, which undermines the academic legitimacy of female thought. We will investigate how gender socialisation influenced a distinct writing style, which can also be viewed as a virtue. This essay aims to highlight the biases embedded within philosophical discourse and advocate for a more inclusive understanding of intellectual contributions. There are numerous examples of women in philosophy who contributed key ideas despite the academic and societal limitations imposed on them; this essay will include just a few.
The historiography of philosophy in the 18th and 19th centuries has played a significant role in perpetuating the notion that there were no female philosophers. While late antiquity through the 17th century exhibited a more inclusive intellectual landscape, the establishment of philosophy as an academic discipline in the 18th century often overlooked or marginalised women's contributions. This essay will mention a few female philosophers within the Anglo-American academic tradition of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Despite the presence of numerous women philosophers during these periods, mechanisms of historical record-keeping and canon formation have obscured their contributions. The canon was formed by men who excluded female philosophers, whether this be due to their unconscious irrational biases or with explicit intent. As this historical narrative is passed down, we are attentive to those who have received most attention and continue to ignore those that are unknown; thus, past biases are perpetuated in the present; those with recognition gain greater prestige while those excluded continue to be overlooked.
An example of the power of historical influence is Bertrand Russell’s influential book History of Western Philosophy. As a respected historian, Russell’s narrative has largely gone unchallenged, further entrenching the marginalisation of female philosophers, obscuring their legacies, and encouraging a lack of engagement with their work in the present. This underscores the need to critically examine the prevailing narratives that have shaped our understanding of women in philosophy and to acknowledge the contributions of all thinkers, regardless of gender. The negative historical attitudes held towards women have influenced the formation of the canon by the outright exclusion and obscuring of female philosophers. This in turn influences the irrational bias of individuals who engage in philosophy. When academia excludes women philosophers, students get the impression that there were none or that their contributions were not worthy of inclusion. This reinforces the idea that philosophy is male-only; studies show that ‘both men and women explicitly associate philosophy with maleness.’ Irrational gender biases created and fostered by sexist socialisation are a key reason for the under-representation of women in philosophy.
Louise Antony gives two models to explore: the difference model, the idea that men and women are innately different, with women not having the same 'aptitude for philosophy as men' and the perfect storm model, which explores the explicit and implicit biases tied to gender norms, which also leads to a stereotype threat that affects how both genders respond to women philosophers. I would like to focus on the second model only. For the first, I would like to note that a person’s dispositions are intrinsic to each individual and are not based on biological sex but gendered socialisation. In our time, explicit biases are now being addressed, but even if one consciously rejects them, they can still ‘hold negative associations’ in their mind. This implicit bias affects not only how women are perceived by men but also how they perceive themselves by internalising gender schemas. Today, female philosophers are still often treated differently in academic settings, untitled or mistitled, labelled as novelists, sociologists, etc. but not credited as philosophers.
If someone's self-evaluation is influenced by the ‘global domination of women by men’’ it is to be expected that it can feel for women in such a historically established male-dominated field as philosophy, ‘alienating.’ ‘Schema Affects Confidence Hypothesis claims that schemas bias people into thinking that men are better at philosophy than women' yet many philosophers believe themselves to be immune from such biases. Studies have also shown there are ‘special climate-related issues for any minority group that has failed to reach critical mass in a particular field.’ Currently in the United States, the women faculty comprise 23%; the critical mass is reached at 25%. An example of an internalised implicit bias could be the prevalence of ‘imposter syndrome'. Irrational biases also show why women philosophers are often excluded under the excuse that their philosophy is ‘bad or derivative.’
In Sophie Connells’ paper, she argues that the use of vice and virtue epistemology can explain why women philosophers’ exclusion from the canon are objectionable. Showing that the attempt to justify the exclusion of female philosophers as derivative or ‘not worth reading’ is an unsatisfactory excuse. ‘Philosophy can be deemed poor philosophy without it ceasing to be philosophy,'' moreover there are many examples of female philosophers whose work has been valued once credited to their male peers. For example, Gottlieb Frege is often credited with foundational contributions to logic and the philosophy of language, overshadowing E.E Constance Jones. Due to the historical context and gender dynamics in academia at the time, this is a key example of gender-biased intellectual erasure. Ruth Barcan’s discussions in modal logic have historically focused on Carnap, despite her contributions preceding his in this area. On Liberty was cowritten by John Taylor Mill and Harriet Taylor Mill. Despite John declaring it to be a joint work with Harriet, this has continued to be disputed. This is evidence of the resistance towards and purposeful denial of women philosophers where their work may be overlooked or attributed to their male counterparts.
Wittgenstein’s treatment towards his female peers is another key example of ‘institutional and social’ gender prejudice; another man ‘deemed entitled to prevent’ or dismiss the development of a female philosopher’s ideas. He viewed Ambrose as just a ‘’clerical aid’’ whose own ideas he tried to prevent from being ‘developed through dialectical processes.’’ Ambrose’s rejection of the worship he required is likely another reason why her ideas were ‘muted’ from the histographies of early analytic philosophy. Elizabeth Anscombe was the only woman tolerated by Wittgenstein. Perhaps a contributing factor to their friendship could be seen in examples such as the apology she started her first paper to the Moral Sciences Club; it reads, ‘Everywhere in this paper I have imitated Dr Wittgenstein's ideas and methods of discussion. The best that I have written is a weak copy of some features of the original.’ Perhaps such praise was a cautious requirement for ‘’self-presentation’’ in academia. Such self-abnegation can also be seen in other early analytic philosophers, such as Susan Stebbing, Phillipa Foot, and Iris Murdoch. Their humility is made even more evident when compared to their male peers 'straight-forward gentlemanly style.’ While this apologetic and submissive style can be due to the gender socialisation of their time, it can also be seen as a virtue of giving credit where credit is due.
From Democritus to Nietzsche, women have been held with contempt. Historically, women have been 'to a great extent shut out from the civilisation in which men took delight', believed to be more prone to folly and ‘wickedness' than logical reasoning or abstract thought holding, seen as holding no value to society in general, let alone philosophy. Russell states, the ‘abuse of women is offered as self-evident truth; it is not backed up by evidence from history.’ And yet, he too wrote of it being unfortunate that a woman thought she had the ‘right to waste the time of great men.’ Thus, contributing to the chauvinistic historical narrative. Philosophical discourse has historically favoured male voices. The intellectual hierarchy associated with philosophy has caused a 'reactionary gatekeeping’ prolonging the false narrative that the idea of women in philosophy is ‘absurd’.
The philosophical canon serves as another illustration of the broader socio-political issue of a gender-biased society where it is believed that ‘women's nature is not just different but also deficient.'The philosophical canon was established in a climate of misogyny. Now we each have a ‘moral responsibility’ to challenge the narrative that there were no women philosophers or that their contributions are unworthy; 'to counteract the neglect of women philosophers, we must allow them to speak.’We must actively work to uncover our implicit biases and include the voices of women philosophers who have been overlooked. We must diversify the canon by incorporating voices from various backgrounds. The epistemological advantages of this inclusivity are significant,as it allows for a broader range of perspectives and experiences that challenge dominant narratives, ultimately enriching philosophical inquiry. ‘A woman would never dare’. Now we must.
Bibliography
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References in order
Ebbersmeyer (2020) p445
Ibid. P449
Connell, S.M. and Janssen-Lauret, F. (2022) P2
Ibid. P4
Gordon‐Roth, J. and Kendrick, N. (2019) P19
Helen Beebee and Jenny Saul. 2021 P13
Ebbersmeyer (2020) P459
Antony, L. (2012) P230
Crouch, M.A., ed. 2014. P4
Dougherty, T., Baron, S. and Miller, K. (2015) P6
Takiff, H.A., Sanchez, D.T. and Stewart, T.L. (2001) P134–144.
Sophia Connell and Frederique Janssen-Lauret. 2023. P2
Rich, Adrienne (1976) P56
Dougherty, T., Baron, S. and Miller, K. (2015) P7
Antony, L. (2012) P236
Bellon, C., and M.Walker, eds. 2011. P5
Ibid.
Ibid.
Sophia Connell and Frederique Janssen-Lauret. 2023. P19
Ibid. P1
Ibid. P29
Ibid. P5 - from Dotson, K 2012
Ibid. P8
Sophia Connell. 2022 P313
Sophia Connell and Frederique Janssen-Lauret. 2023. P26
Sophia Connell. 2022 P328
Ibid. P326
Ibid. P329
Ibid.P312
Sophia Connell and Frederique Janssen-Lauret. 2023. P22
Sophia Connell and Frederique Janssen-Lauret. 2023 P22
Ibid. P9
Russell, B. (1979) P89/731
Ibid. P42
Ibid. P316
Ibid. P734
Ibid. P544 (On Descartes correspondence with Queen Christina of Sweden.)
Sophia Connell and Frederique Janssen-Lauret. 2023 P1
Antony, L. (2012) P227
Ebbersmeyer (2020) P455
Brownstein, M. 2019 P19
Sophia Connell. 2022 P329
Dotson, K. 2012. P15
Krishnamurthy, M. 2016. P2
Michele Le Deouff, 1989. P126
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